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ARTICLE 
THE NINTH CIRCUIT LANDS A 
"PERFECT 10" APPLYING COPYRIGHT 
LA W TO THE INTERNET 
ROBERT A. MCFARLANE· 
INTRODUCTION 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued three landmark 
decisions in 2007 that addressed how copyright protections apply to 
images that can be accessed over the Internet. Internet publisher Perfect 
10 initiated these lawsuits based on allegations that its registered 
copyrights were infringed when unauthorized copies of its photographs 
appeared on third-party websites where they could be viewed, 
downloaded, and purchased without payment to Perfect 10. I 
Due at least in part to the alleged difficulty of bringing 
infringement suits against the individuals who it believed were directly 
infringing its copyrights by downloading unauthorized copies,2 Perfect 
* Mr. McFarlane is a litigation partner in the San Francisco office of Townsend and 
Townsend and Crew LLP who specializes in patent litigation, intellectual property disputes and 
counseling, and software performance and complex commercial matters. He received his J.D. from 
the University of California Hastings College of the Law in 1994 and his B.A.S. in Industrial 
Engineering and Political Science from Stanford University in 1990. 
I Perfect 10 Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 2007); Perfect 10 v. 
Visa Int'l Serv Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007); Perfect 10 v. CC Bill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th 
Cir. 2007). 
2 See, e.g., MGM Studios v. Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 929-30 (2005) ("When a widely 
shared service or product is used to commit infringement, it may be impossible to enforce rights in 
the protected work effectively against all direct infringers, the only practical alternative being to go 
against the distributor of the copying device for secondary liability on a theory of contributory or 
381 
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10 sought to recover damages for direct and indirect copyright 
infringement from entities responsible for aspects of the Internet that, 
when linked together across the world wide web, allegedly contributed to 
or facilitated the infringing transactions? Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com 
reviewed Perfect 1O's request for a preliminary injunction based 
primarily on its claim that co-defendant Google directly and indirectly 
infringed its copyrights.4 Specifically, Perfect 10 alleged that Google, 
among other things, operated a search engine that indexed its 
copyrighted images, stored low-resolution "thumbnail" versions of the 
images on its servers, facilitated the display of those images on users' 
computer screens, and provided programming instructions that informed 
users' web browser software how to access full size versions of the 
infringing images through the Internet.5 Perfect 10 v. Visa International 
Service Ass'n, reviewed Perfect 1O's attempt to impose liability for 
contributory and vicarious copyright infringement against financial 
institutions that process credit card payments to websites that allegedly 
profited by selling unauthorized copies of Perfect 10' s copyrighted 
images.6 Finally, Perfect 10 v. CC Bill Inc. reviewed an attempt to 
impose liability for, among other things, providing web hosting and 
related Internet connectivity services to the owners of infringing 
websites, and provided the Ninth Circuit an opportunity to clarify several 
of the safe harbor and notice provisions contained in the Digital 
Millennial Copyright Act (DMCA).7 
Since the United States Constitution enshrined the protection of 
copyright in this country,8 courts have been faced with the difficulties of 
applying copyright law to ever-evolving technologies that did not exist 
vicarious infringement."). See also Perfect 10 v. Visa Int'l Serv Ass'n, 494 F.3d at 823 «Kozinski, J., 
dissenting) Noting that "[itl would certainly be much easier" if Perfect 10 were suing the companies 
selling unauthorized copies of its images over the internet. "No doubt, they would if they could. 
But direct infringers are sometimes too ubiquitous, too small or too difficult to findFalse Here, 
plaintiff alleges that many direct infringers have no physical presence in the United States. They 
operate from far-off jurisdictions, where lawsuits are difficult to bring and remedies impossible to 
enforce because the infringers can easily move their operations to servers in other remote 
jurisdictions."). 
3 Perfect 10 Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1146; Perfect 10 v. Visa Int'l Serv Ass'n, 
494 F.3d at 788; Perfect 10 v. CC Bill LLC, 488 F.3d at 1102. 
4 The allegations against Amazon.com were based in large measure on Amazon.com's 
display of search results and "thumbnail" images generated by Google. Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, 
Inc., 508 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2007) Perfect 10 initially brought separate cases against Amazon.com 
and Google. However the cases were consolidated by the district court. See Perfect 10 v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1157. 
5 1d. at 1155-56. 
6 Perfect 10 v. Visa Int'l Serv Ass'n, 494 F.3d at 793. 
7 Perfect 10 v. CC BILL LLC, 488 F.3d at 1102. 
8 U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 8. 
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when the applicable statutes were enacted. The trilogy of published 
Ninth Circuit decisions arising from Perfect lO's copyright actions 
represents an important and potentially far-reaching development in the 
application of copyright laws to new technologies of the Internet and an 
analysis of the policy goals underlying copyright law as applied to the 
internet. This Article briefly summarizes the facts of these three cases, 
explains the central holdings of each decision, and then concludes with a 
discussion of the collective impact that the three decisions have on 
enforcement of copyrights in the Internet context and the policy reasons 
supporting the court's decisions. 
I. PERFECT 10' S ATTEMPT TO IMpOSE LIABILITY ON GOOGLE AND 
AMAZON. COM FOR UNAUTHORIZED DISPLAY AND PUBLICATION OF 
ITS COPYRIGHTED IMAGES 
Perfect 10 marketed and sold copyrighted images of nude models 
through an eponymous adult magazine and a subscription website. 9 
Perfect 10 asserted that it had invested $36 million to develop its brand, 
including $12 million to create the photographic images, and that it 
generated virtually all of its revenue from sales of its print magazine and 
the monthly subscription charge that allowed paying customers to access 
the copyrighted images through a password-protected "members only" 
portion of its website. 1O Perfect 10 also derived a small portion of its 
revenue from a licensing agreement that provided for the worldwide sale 
and distribution of reduced size images for use on cell phones. II The 
underlying basis of Perfect 10' s complaints in Peifect 10 v. Amazon. com, 
Peifect 10 v. Visa Int'l Service Ass 'n, and Peifect 10 v. CC Bill centered 
around the unauthorized duplication, access, and sale of its copyrighted 
images through web sites that provided no payments to Perfect 10.12 
A. GOOGLE'S SEARCH ENGINE AND THE ACCESS OF IMAGES OVER THE 
INTERNET 
The Ninth Circuit's decision provided an informative description 
of operations that locate, store, access, and display images across the 
9 Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F.Supp.2d 828, 831-32 (C.D.Cal. 2006), affd in part rev'd 
in part and remanded, 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). 
10 [d. 
II [d. 
12 Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1157 (9th Cir. 2007); Perfect 10 v. Visa In!,1 
Serv Ass'n" 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007); Perfect 10 v. CC Bill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 
2007). 
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Internet and, therefore, that are critical to its analysis of Google's 
potential liability for infringing copyrights in such images. The court 
explained that the "Internet is a world-wide network ... [of computers] 
all sharing a common communications technology.,,13 Information 
stored on individual computers can be provided to other computers 
connected to the Internet via web pages, which consist of text 
interspersed with instructions in Hypertext Markup Language (HTML).14 
Significantly for the court's analysis, images are not stored on web 
pages. Instead, web pages contain instructions in HTML that provide 
addresses identifying the network locations where images are stored. 15 
Generally, web pages are publicly available through the Internet and can 
be accessed by computer users through the Internet using a web 
browser. 16 
Google's search engine is a software program that automatically 
accesses thousands of websites, which are collections of individual web 
pages, and indexes them in a database maintained on Google's 
computers. 17 When locating images, Google's search engine does not 
recognize images, but identifies text in the Google database responsive to 
the user's query and provides reduced-size, lower-resolution versions of 
the images called "thumbnails.,,18 Google stores these thumbnails on its 
servers, but does not store copies of the full-sized images. 19 Instead, 
Google provides instructions in HTML that allow a user's web browser 
to locate and download them from other, third-party computers 
connected through the Internet. 20 Thus, although the thumbnail and full-
size image may appear on the user's screen to consist of a single 
integrated presentation, the two images actually come from two different 
sources: Google's server in the case of the thumbnail, and a third-party 
website in the case of the full-sized image.21 The process of 
incorporating these images into a single window is called "in-line 
linking," and the process allowing information from one computer to 
frame and annotate the in-line linked content from another computer is 
13 Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1155. 
14/d. 
15/d. 
16 1d. Microsoft's Internet Explorer is an example of a web-browser. See, e.g., MICROSOFT 
COMPUTER DICTIONARY 243-44, 479 (4th ed. 1999). 
17 Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1155. 
18 1d. 
19 1d. 
20 See ld. 
21 ld. at 1155-56. 
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called "framing.,,22 Google also stores web page text in a "cache," a 
form of memory with short access time which stores frequently used 
instructions or data.23 
Google also generated revenue through an arrangement with 
Amazon.com through which Amazon.com in-line linked to Google 
search results, allowing Amazon.com to provide search results generated 
by Google on its web pages.24 Finally, Google generated revenue 
through a program called "Ad Sense," wherein website owners could 
register with Google, place HTML instructions on their web pages, and 
allow Google's algorithms to automatically select relevant 
advertisements to be displayed when the website is accessed. 25 The Ad 
Sense "partners" and Google would then share revenue generated by the 
advertisement. 26 
B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT LARGELY REJECTED PERFECT lO's THEORIES 
THAT GOOGLE DIRECTLY INFRINGED ITS COPYRIGHTS 
Peifect 10 v. Amazon.com provided a succinct primer in the law 
of direct and indirect copyright infringement and then applied those 
principles to the Internet. To present a prima facie case of direct 
copyright infringement, the plaintiff must show that it owns the allegedly 
infringed material and that the infringer has violated at least one of the 
exclusive rights granted under 17 U.S.c. § 106, namely, the rights to 
reproduce, distribute, and publicly display the copyrighted work.27 Since 
Perfect 10' s ownership of at least some of the images at issue was not 
disputed, the opinion focused on allegations that Perfect lO's exclusive 
rights were being infringed. 28 
The Ninth Circuit applied the basic definitions set forth in the 
Copyright Act and the novel "server test" originally devised by the 
district court to determine whether Perfect 10 had established a prima 
facie case that Google directly infringed its copyrights.29 For purposes of 
the Copyright Act, to "display" an image means "to show a copy of it, 
either directly or by means of a film, slide, television image, or any other 
22 1d. 
23 ld. at 1156. Significantly, Google's cache includes text only; it does not include images 
from third-party web pages. Id. (emphasis added). 
24 ld. 
25 ld. 
26 ld. 
27 Id. at 1159 (citations omitted). 
28 ld. 
29 Id. at 1159-62. 
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device or process," wherein a "copy" is a "material object [], ... in which 
a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed and from 
which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated, ... " and wherein "[a] work is fixed in a tangible medium 
of expression when its embodiment ... is sufficiently permanent or stable 
to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for 
a period more than transitory duration. ,,30 As used in this definition, a 
photographic image is "fixed" in a tangible medium of expression in the 
context of computers when it is "embodied (i.e., stored) in a computer's 
server (or hard disk, or other storage device)," and the digitally stored 
image is considered a "copy" as defined under the Copyright Act. 31 
Applying these definitions, computer users "display" a "copy" of a 
photographic image when their computer fills its screen with a copy of 
the image as it is stored, or "fixed" in the computer's memory.32 Thus, 
the court's analysis of whether Google directly infringed Perfect 10' s 
display right turned largely on whether the image displayed on the user's 
computer screen was stored on Google's servers, an analysis christened 
"the server test.,,33 Applying this criteria, the court found that Perfect 10 
had not established a prima facie case of direct infringement based on 
Google's process of in-line linking full-sized images from third-party 
websites or its storage of web page text in its cache for the simple reason 
that the copyrighted image displayed on a user's computer screen was 
never stored on Google's servers. Rather, Google simply provided 
HTML instructions through which images stored on third-party 
computers were located and accessed.34 The court found that providing 
these instructions was not equivalent to "displaying" a "copy" of the 
image and, therefore, Google did not directly infringe Perfect lO's 
copyrights through these two activities. 35 
Applying the server test, the Ninth Circuit reached the opposite 
conclusion when Google's thumbnail images were displayed on a user's 
computer and found that Perfect 10 had, in fact, established a prima facie 
30 Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1160 (citing 17 U.S.C. §101). 
31 Id. (citing MAl Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517 -18 (9th Cir. 1993». 
32 Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1160. 
33/d. at 1159, 1161. 
34 /d. at 1160-62. 
35 Id. at 1161 (also noting that the assistance provided by Google gave rise only to issues of 
contributory liability). The court found that Perfect 10 would not likely prevail on its theory that 
Google directly infringed its exclusive right to distribute full-size copies of its copyrighted images 
for the same reason. Since Google's search engine provided HTML instructions to the end user's 
browser that identified the location of an image, but did not "distribute" a "copy" of the image that 
was stored on Google's own servers as required to show infringement of this exclusive right there 
was no infringement. /d. at 1160. 
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case of direct infringement in this instance because such images were 
stored on Google's servers.36 Thus, when the user viewed a copy of the 
image on his or her computer screen, it represented the display of a copy 
that was fIxed in a tangible medium on Google's servers, and, therefore, 
represented potential direct infringement. 37 
C. THE NINTH CIRCUIT APPROVED GOOGLE'S FAIR USE DEFENSE 
Having found that Perfect 10 had established a prima facie case of 
direct infringement based on Google's use of thumbnail images, the 
court went on to fInd that Google would likely prevail on its fair use 
defense, and, consequently, vacated the preliminary injunction issued by 
the district court that otherwise prohibited Google from creating and 
publicly displaying thumbnail versions of Perfect 10' s images.38 The fair 
use defense, which is codifIed at 17 U.S.C. § 107, "permits the use of 
copyrighted works without the copyright owner's consent under certain 
situations," including "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching 
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or 
research ... ,,39 In evaluating a fair use defense the court must weigh four 
factors: 
1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such 
use is a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes; 
2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation 
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of 
the copyrighted work.40 
The fair use defense requires a case-by-case analysis in which the court 
is to explore each of the factors, weigh them together in light of the 
purpose of copyright law as set forth in the United States Constitution "to 
promote the progress of science and the useful arts,'.41 and to serve "the 
36 ,d. at 1160. 
37
,d. 
38 ,d. at 1154, 1168-1169. The court also reversed the district court regarding the burden of 
proof on this defense. The court held that, since Perfect 10 had shown a likelihood of success on the 
merits of its direct infringement claim, the burden shifted to Google to establish a likelihood that the 
affirmative defense would be successful. Id. at 1158. 
39 ,d. at 1163. 
40 17 U.S.c. §107. 
41 U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, c1. 8. 
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welfare of the public.,,42 Additionally, as dictated by federal statute, "the 
fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if 
such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.,,43 
The Ninth Circuit first considered the "purpose and character" of 
Google's use of thumbnail images, concluding that it was "highly 
transformative," and concluding that the first factor weighted heavily in 
Google's favor.44 The "central purpose" of the analysis under this factor 
is to "determine whether and to what extent the new work is 
'transformative.',,45 A work is transformative when it "does not 'merely 
supersede the objects of the original creation,' but rather 'adds something 
new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with 
new expression, meaning, or message.",46 Conversely, a new work is 
likely not transformative and, therefore, not likely a "fair use" if it 
"supersede[s] the use of the original.,,47 
The court's conclusion that the thumbnails were highly 
trans formative was based on several factors. First, Google's thumbnail 
images served a different function than the originals.48 "Although an 
image may have been originally created to serve an entertainment, 
aesthetic, or informative function, a search engine transforms the image 
into a pointer directing a user to a source of information.,,49 Moreover, 
the "search engine provides social benefit by incorporating an original 
work into a new work, namely, an electronic reference tool," which 
places the images "into a different context" so that they are "transformed 
into a new creation.,,5o Additionally, the court rejected Perfect 1O's 
argument that Google's use of thumbnail images was not transformative 
because such images superseded Perfect 1O's right to sell reduced-size 
images for use in cell phones and because Google's use of the images 
was commercial in nature. Following the Supreme Court's directive to 
42 Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1163 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,429 n.l 0, (1984) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 60-2222,.at 7 (1909)). 
43 17 U.S.C. §107. 
44 Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1164-66. 
45 1d. at 1164 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, at 579 (1994)). 
46 Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1164 (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579). 
47 Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1164 (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 550-51 (1985)). 
48 Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1165. See also Kelly v. Arriba Soft Soft Corp., 336 
F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that thumbnail images generated by a search engine are 
transformative because they served a different function than the originals, namely improving access 
to information rather than artistic expression (emphasis added)). 
49 Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1165. 
50 1d. (citing Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. County Sheriffs Dept., 447 F.3d 769, 778 (9th Cir. 
2006)). 
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weigh "the extent to which a use promotes the purposes of copyright and 
serves the interests of the public,,,51 the Ninth Circuit concluded that the 
"significantly transformative nature of Google's search engine" heavily 
outweighed "any incidental superseding use or minor commercial aspects 
of Google's search engine and website," and that the purpose and 
character of Google's use weighed heavily in favor of finding it was a 
"fair use. ,,52 
The Ninth Circuit further found that the district court did not err 
in ruling that the second factor regarding the nature of the copyrighted 
work weighed slightly in favor of Perfect 10 and that the third factor 
regarding the amount and substantiality of the portion used favored 
neither party.53 Finally, the court concluded that the fourth factor, the 
effect of the use on the market, favored neither party.54 The court 
reasoned, as it had in Kelly, that Google's use of thumbnails did not hurt 
Perfect lO's marketing of full-sized images and, further, that any harm to 
Perfect 10' s market in reduced-size images for cell phones was 
hypothetica1.55 The court concluded that 
Google has put Perfect IO's thumbnail images (along with millions of 
other thumbnail images) to a use fundamentally different than the use 
intended by Perfect 10. In doing so, Google has provided a significant 
benefit to the public. Weighing this significant transformative use 
against the unproven use of Google's thumbnails for cell phone 
downloads, and considering the other fair use factors, all in light of the 
purpose of copyright, we conclude that Google's use of Perfect lO's 
th b '1' f' 56 urn nm s IS a au use. 
Having so concluded, the Ninth Circuit found that Google would 
likely succeed in proving its fair use defense and vacated the district 
51 Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1166 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579; Harper & 
Row Publishers, Inc. v, Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1985); Sony Corp. of Am. v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,431-32 (1984)). 
52 See Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1166-67. 
53 See Id. at 1167-68. The court minimized application of the second factor by stating that, 
although the images were '''creative in nature', and thus 'closer to the core of intended copyright 
protection,'" they were previously published and not entitled to the enhanced protection available 
prior to first publication. Id. at 1167 (relying on Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d at 82 I). 
Additionally, the court relied on the conclusion in Kelly v. Ariba Soft that the use of an entire image 
within a thumbnail was reasonable in light of the purpose to allow users to recognize the image and 
decide whether to pursue more information about it or the originating website. Id. (citing Kelly, 336 
F.3d at 821). 
54 Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1168. 
55 1d. 
56 1d. 
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court's preliminary injunction against Google's use of thumbnail 
. 57 
unages. 
D. THE NINTH CIRCUIT REMANDED FOR FURTHER FACT FINDING 
REGARDING PERFECT lO's CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT CLAlM 
BUT REJECTED ITS CLAlM FOR VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
Perfect 10' s allegations that Google should be held liable under 
theories of contributory and vicarious infringement provided the Ninth 
Circuit with the opportunity to address fundamental issues affecting the 
potential liability for major Internet companies based on the acts of 
individuals who use their services. The court's analysis is particularly 
significant because it interprets the Supreme Court's recent decision in 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 58 as it applies to 
the novel issues before the court. 
Under the rule enunciated in Grokster, a company may be held 
liable for contributory copyright infringement if it "intentionally 
induc[es] or encourage[es] direct infringement," and for vicarious 
infringement if it "profit[s] from direct infringement while declining to 
exercise a right to stop or limit it.,,59 Since the litigants did not dispute 
that third-parties directly infringed Perfect 10' s copyrights by 
reproducing, displaying and distributing unauthorized copies of Perfect 
10' s copyrighted images through the Internet,60 the court reviewed 
Google's potential liability for secondary infringement under both 
contributory and vicarious liability theories. 
Under long-standing case law, "one who, with knowledge of the 
infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the 
infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a 'contributory' 
infringer.,,61 The Ninth Circuit further refined this rule as it applies to 
57 1d. 
58 545 U.s. 913 (2005). 
59 1d. at 930 (internal citations omitted). See also Perfect 10 v. Visa Int'l Serv Assoc., 494 
F.3d 788, 795 (9th Cir. 2007) ("a defendant is a contributory infringer if it (I) has knowledge of a 
third party's infringing activity, and (2) induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing 
conduct." (citations omitted)); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 
2001) (finding contributory liability in an internet context where the defendant had engaged "in 
personal conduct that encourages or assists the infringement"). 
60 Perfect IO v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1170. 
61 Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 
(2nd Cir. 1971). See also Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1171 (finding that the rule set fort 
in Gershwin is consistent with the Supreme Court's Grokster decision). The court explained this 
rule at some length in Perfect IO v. Visa International Servo Ass'n., 494 F.3d at 794-95. 
Contributory copyright infringement is based on the tort concepts of enterprise liability and imputed 
intent. /d. at 794-95. And, although the test has been formulated in various ways, the basic test is 
10
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cyberspace in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. by holding that "if a 
computer system operator learns of specific infringing material available 
on his system and fails to purge such material from the system, the 
operator knows of and contributes to direct infringement. ,,62 
Applying the law as stated in Gershwin, Grokster, and Napster, 
the Ninth Circuit found it necessary to remand the issue of Google's 
potential contributory infringement for further fact finding by the district 
court.63 The parties did not dispute that Google's search engine 
substantially assists websites owners in distributing infringing copies of 
Perfect 10' s copyrighted images or that it assists users in accessing 
infringing materials.64 Thus, "Google could be held contributorily liable 
if it had knowledge that infringing Perfect 10 images were available 
using its search engine, could take simple measures to prevent further 
damage to Perfect 10' s copyrighted works, and failed to take such 
steps.,,65 The district court did not resolve factual disputes regarding the 
adequacy of Perfect 10' s notice of infringement to Google, the adequacy 
of Google's responses to such notice, or the availability to Google of 
reasonable and feasible means to halt the direct infringement using its 
search engine. 66 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit remanded the issue for 
the district court to decide whether "Perfect 10 would likely succeed in 
establishing that Google was contributorily liable for in-line linking to 
full-size infringing images ... ,,67 
The Ninth Circuit did not look favorably on Perfect lO's claim 
that Google could be held liable for vicarious copyright infringement. 
Under Grokster, a claim for vicarious infringement can succeed only if 
the plaintiff demonstrates that "the defendant exercises the requisite 
control over the direct infringer and that the defendant derives a direct 
financial benefit from the direct infringement. ,,68 A defendant is 
that one contributorily infringes when he (I) has knowledge of another's infringement and (2) either 
(a) materially contributes to or (b) induces that infringement. Id. at 795. 
62 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 FJd 1004, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001). 
63 Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 FJd 1146 at 1172-73. 
64 ld. at 1172. 
65 1d. at 1172 (emphasis added). 
66 ld. at 1173. 
67 1d. at 1172-73. 
68 Id. (citing MGM Studios v. Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005). The court further 
explained this standard in Perfect 10 v. Visa International Servo Ass'n., 494 F.3d at 802: 
Whereas contributory infringement is based on tort-law principles of enterprise liability and 
imputed intent, vicarious infringement's roots lie in the agency principles of respondeat 
superior. To state a claim for vicarious copyright infringement, a plaintiff must allege that 
the defendant has (I) the right and ability to supervise the infringing conduct and (2) a direct 
financial interest in the infringing activity .... one infringes vicariously by profiting from 
direct infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it. 
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considered to have such control over a direct infringer only when it has 
"a legal right to stop or limit the directly infringing conduct," and "the 
practical ability to do so. ,,69 The court found that Perfect 10 failed to 
demonstrate Google had either. First, Perfect 10 failed to demonstrate a 
likelihood that Google had the legal right to stop or limit the direct 
infringement by third-parties. 70 Second, the district court found that 
Google did not have the practical ability to police potential infringement 
of third-party web sites identified through its search engine. 71 
Specifically, Google's software did not have the "ability to analyze every 
image in [the I]nternet, compare each image to all the other copyrighted 
images that exist in the world ... and determine whether a certain image 
on the web infringes someone' s copyright." 72 Thus, the court concluded 
that Perfect 10 was not likely to establish the "control prong" necessary 
for imposing vicarious liability.73 
II. PERFECT lO'S FAILED ATTEMPT TO "FOLLLOW THE MONEY" AND 
HOLD FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS LIABLE FOR SECONDARY 
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT BASED ON PAYMENTS MADE TO 
ALLEGEDLY INFRINGING WEBSITES 
Due to the alleged difficulty of suing the individuals that it 
believed were directly infringing its copyrights,74 Perfect 10 sued a host 
of financial institutions, including Visa and Mastercard, that processed 
charges incurred by customers who acquired the infringing images from 
Id. (citations and quotations omitted). 
fB Perfect JO v. Amazon.com, at 1173 (emphasis added). 
70 Id. at 1173-74. 
71 Id. at 1174. 
72 Id. (citing Perfect JO v. Amazon.com, Inc., 416 F.Supp.2d at 858). 
73 Perfect JO v. Amazon.com, at 1174. The Ninth Circuit briefly addressed two additional 
issues in its decision. First, the district court had not reached the issue of whether Perfect 10' s 
notices of infringement to Google were sufficient under the DMCA, because it determined Perfect 
10 was unlikely to demonstrate liability for either contributory or vicarious liability. The remand 
included an instruction that the court consider whether Google was likel y to demonstrate it was 
entitled to the limitations on injunctive relief provided by the safe harbor provisions in title II of the 
DMCA. Id. at 1175-76. 
Finally, the court remanded certain of Perfect lO's claims against Amazon.com for the court to 
consider potential contributory liability, as well as possible limitations on the scope of injunctive 
relief in light of the legal conclusions it reached in analyzing the allegations as to Google. !d. at 
1175-76. Additionally, the court agreed that Perfect 10 was not likely to prevail on its claims that 
Amazon.com directly infringed its copyrights for reasons similar to those detailed in its analysis of 
the claim against Google. See Id. 
74 See supra, note 2. 
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third-party websites. 75 The Ninth Circuit believed a finding that "the 
Defendants' activities fall within the scope of [indirect copyright 
infringement] would require a radical and inappropriate expansion of 
existing principles of secondary liability and would violate the public 
policy of the United States.,,76 Accordingly, the court affirmed the 
dismissal with prejudice of Perfect lO's causes of action for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).77 
A. DEFENDANTS WERE NOT LIABLE FOR CONTRIBUTORY 
INFRINGEMENT 
The Ninth Circuit flatly rejected Perfect lO's claim that the 
financial institution defendants could be held liable for contributory 
infringement on the grounds that they allegedly continued to process 
credit card payments to the infringing web sites after being informed of 
the infringing activity.78 First, the court found that the financial 
institutions simply did not materially contribute to the alleged 
infringement such that liability could be assessed: 
The credit card companies cannot be said to materially contribute to 
the infringement in this case because they have no direct connection to 
that infringement. Here, the infringement rests on the reproduction, 
alteration, display, and distribution of Perfect 10' s images over the 
Internet. Perfect 10 has not alleged that any infringing material passes 
over Defendants' payment networks or through their payment 
processing systems, or that Defendants' systems are used to alter or 
display the infringing images. 79 
In reaching its conclusion, the majority distinguished the recent 
holding of Peifect 10 v. Amazon. com. The court started with the 
conclusion in Amazon.com that "Google could be held contributorily 
liable if it had knowledge that infringing Perfect 10 images were 
available using its search engine, could take simple measures to prevent 
further damage to Perfect 10' s copyrighted works, and failed to take such 
steps. ,,80 The majority found the salient distinction was that "Google's 
75 Perfect JO v. Visa Int'! Servo Ass'n., at 794. 
76 !d. at 795. 
77 Id. at 792. 
78 Id. at 796. 
79 1d. at 796. 
80 Perfect 10 v. Visa Int'! Serve Ass'n, 494 F.3d at 797 (citing Perfect 10, Inc. v. 
Amazon.com, 487 F.3d 70 I, 729 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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search engine itself assists in the distribution of infringing content to 
Internet users, while defendants' payment systems do not.,,81 Indeed, the 
most that could be said of the defendants' payment system was that it 
made it easier for the infringement to be profitable; the infringement 
could still occur without using the defendants' systems, and there were 
other viable funding mechanisms available. 82 Moreover, the court noted 
that the Amazon. com decision reasoned that "Google substantially assists 
websites to distribute their infringing copies to a worldwide market and 
assists a worldwide audience of users to access infringing materials.,,83 
However, in the Visa case, the defendants did not provide an analogous 
service and, moreover, their activity was even further removed from the 
act of direct infringement than the conduct at issue in Amazon. com: 
[Defendants] in no way assist or enable Internet users to locate 
infringing material, and they do not distribute it. They do, as alleged, 
make infringement more profitable, and people are generally more 
inclined to engage in an activity when it is financially profitable. 
However, there is an additional step in the causal chain: Google may 
materially contribute to infringement by making it fast and easy for 
third parties to locate and distribute infringing material, whereas 
Defendants make it easier for infringement to be profitable, which 
tends to increase financial incentives to infringe, which in tum tends to 
increase infringement.84 
Consequently, the majority did not believe Amazon.com mandated a 
finding that the credit card companies and others who processed the 
payments at issue could be held contributorily liable. 
The court also distinguished two of its earlier cases finding 
liability for contributory infringement, Fonovisa Inc. v. Cherry Auction, 
Inc.,85 and A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 86 The Fonovisa court 
found a flea market proprietor was liable for contributory copyright 
infringement predicated on infringing sales taking place at the swap meet 
it operated. In this case, the proprietor provided the extensive support 
that facilitated the infringement, namely the "space, utilities, parking, 
advertisement, plumbing and customers," which the court designated the 
81 Perfect 10 v. Visa In"l Serve Ass'n, 494 F.3d at 797. 
82 Id. at 797 -98. 
83 Id. at 797. 
84 /d. 
85 76 F.3d 259 (9th CiT. 1996). 
86 239 F.3d 1004 (9th CiT. 2001). Judge Kozinski's dissent asserted these and other 
distinctions in the majority's analysis were "ephemeral" at best. See Perfect 10 v. Visa In"l Serv 
Ass 'n, 494 F.3d at 825 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
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"site and facilities" for the sale of pirated works.87 Similarly, the 
landmark Internet case Napster found the designer and distributor of a 
file sharing program liable for contributory infringement, because its 
program was expressly engineered to enable easy exchange of pirated 
music and was widely used for such purposes.88 The majority in the Visa 
case found that in both of these earlier cases, the defendant "increased 
the level of infringement by providing a centralized place, whether 
physical or virtual, where infringing works could be collected, sorted, 
found, and bought, sold, or exchanged.,,89 In contrast, Visa and the other 
financial institution defendants "do no such thing;" they did not operate 
the "site" of the infringement, i.e., the websites where the infringing 
works were available, nor did they create, operate, advertise, or 
otherwise promote these websites. 90 Additionally, unlike Napster, the 
defendants do not "provide users the tools to locate infringing material," 
or operate any network or computer storing or transmitting the infringing 
material. 91 Simply put, the defendants "merely provide a method of 
payment, not a 'site' or 'facility' of infringement," and the majority 
found that operating such a payment system was insufficient basis to 
impose contributory liability. 92 
B. DEFENDANTS WERE NOT LIABLE FOR INDUCING INFRINGEMENT 
The court also readily disposed of Perfect lO's claim for 
inducement. Following Grokster, "one who distributes a device [or 
offers a service] with the object of promoting its use to infringe 
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken 
to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by 
third parties.'.93 "Mere knowledge of infringing potential or actual 
infringing uses" is insufficient to establish this form of liability, and it is 
crucial for the plaintiff to establish that the alleged inducer 
87 76 F.3d at 264. Additionally, the Court found in Fonavisa that the primary infringers and 
the swap meet owner were engaged in a mutual enterprise and that "it would be difficult for the 
infringing activity to take place in the massive quantity alleged without the support services provided 
by the swap meet." Id. The proprietor's culpability was also heightened because it failed to provide 
the country sheriff with information intended to discourage counterfeit sales following a raid at the 
swap meet in which 38,000 counterfeit recordings were seized. Id. at 261, 264. 
88 A&M Records, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1020, n.5, and 1022. 
89 Perfect !O v. Visa Int'[ Serv Ass'n, 494 F.3d at 799. 
90 Id. at 799-800. 
91 Id. at 800. 
92 See Id. ("While Perfect 10 has alleged that Defendants make it easier for web sites to profit 
from this infringing activity, the infringement stems from the failure to obtain a license to distribute, 
not the processing of payments."). 
93 1d. at 800 (quoting MGM Studios v. Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936-37 (2005)). 
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":communicated an inducing message to their users[, for example] an 
advertisement or solicitation that broadcasts a message designed to 
stimulate others to commit violations.,,94 
In sum, where an article is good for nothing else but infringement, 
there is no legitimate public interest in its unlicensed availability, and 
there is no injustice in presuming or imputing an intent to infringe. 
Conversely, the doctrine absolves the equivocal conduct of selling an 
item with substantial lawful as well as unlawful uses, and limits 
liability to instances of more acute fault than the mere understanding 
that some of one's products will be misused. It leaves breathing room 
l" • d' 95 lor mnovatlOn an VIgorous commerce. 
The majority had little difficulty finding the defendants were not 
liable under this standard because Perfect 10 alleged no affirmative steps 
taken to foster infringement, there were no facts suggesting defendants 
promoted their payment system as a means to infringe copyright, and 
defendants marketed credit cards as a means to pay for goods and 
services, rather than as a means to thwart copyright laws as in the 
Napster case.96 Finally, the court held that Perfect 10' s allegation that 
the defendants allowed their names and logos to be displayed on the 
allegedly infringing sites fell short of a "clear expression" of a specific 
intent to foster infringement. 97 
C. DEFENDANTS WERE NOT LIABLE FOR VICARIOUS COPYRIGHT 
INFRINGEMENT 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit majority rejected Perfect 10' s claim 
based on vicarious copyright infringement. As discussed above, a claim 
for vicarious infringement must include allegations that the defendant 
has both a financial interest in the infringing activity and the right and 
ability to supervise the infringing activity.98 Perfect 10 based its claim 
on defendants' rules that required member banks to terminate a 
merchant's participation in their payment networks if they engaged in 
certain illegal activity, and thus, it argued, defendants had it within their 
power to stop processing payments to infringing sites.99 
Relying on the analysis of Perfect 10 v. Amazon. com, the court 
94 Perfect IO v. Visa Int'/ Serv Ass'n, 494 F.3d at 800. (quoting Grokster, 545 U.S. at 937). 
95 Perfect 10 v. Visa Int'/ Serv Ass'n, 494 F.3d at 801 (quoting Grokster, 545 U.S. 932-33). 
96 Perfect IO v. Visa Int'/ Serv Ass'n, 494 F.3d at 800, 801. 
97 /d. at 802. 
98 See supra notes 57 to 72 and accompanying text, Part n.D. 
99 /d. at 802-03. 
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found that the ability to terminate payments fell short of giving the 
defendants the requisite right to control the infringing activity.)OO 
Moreover, even if defendants withdrew their payment mechanism, "an 
infringing third-party website can continue to reproduce, display, and 
distribute its infringing copies of the [copyrighted] images ... " 10) 
Consequently, defendants' rules only gave them the ability to indirectly 
influence the infringing activity to some degree, and did not provide the 
direct control required to find vicarious liability. Finally, the majority 
emphatically concluded that finding vicarious liability on the facts before 
it represented a "radical step we do not take.,,102 
III. CC BILL AND THE NINTH ClRCUIT' S INTERPRETATION OF THE 
DMCA SAFE HARBOR AND NOTICE PROVISIONS 
Communications technology has long created challenges in 
determining the appropriate scope of copyright protections. Prior to the 
rise of the Internet, Congress adopted a "passive carrier" exemption that 
released parties such as telephone companies from liability for copyright 
infringement when their "activities with respect to the secondary 
transmission [of copyrighted works] consisted solely of providing wires, 
cables, or other communications channels for the use of others.,,)03 The 
advent of the Internet gave rise to even more complex issues regarding 
the scope of liability for copyright infringement, for example, whether to 
impose liability on certain parties such as system operators who maintain 
the network or server that makes it possible for the end-users to access 
protected works.)04 
As reflected in the legislative history of the DMCA, Congress 
determined that appropriate limitations on copyright liability were 
important to the development of a robust Internet: 
[W]ithout clarification of their liability, service providers may hesitate 
to make the necessary investment in the expansion of the speed and 
capacity of the Internet. In the ordinary course of their operations 
service providers must engage in all kinds of acts that expose them to 
potential copyright infringement liability. For example, service 
providers must make innumerable electronic copies by simply 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 803. 
102 ld. 
103 See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
12B.0I[A][I](perm.ed., rev.vol. 2007) (citing 17 U.S.C. §111(a)(3)). 
104 ld. 
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transmitting information over the Internet. Certain electronic copies 
are made to speed up the delivery of information to users. Other 
electronic copies are made in order to host World Wide Web sites. 
Many service providers engage in directing users to sites in response 
to inquiries by users or they volunteer sites that users may find 
attractive. Some of these sites might contain infringing material. In 
short, by limiting the liability of service providers, the DMCA ensures 
that the efficiency of the Internet will continue to improve and that the 
variety and quality of services on the Internet will continue to 
expand. lOS 
One of the ways in which the DMCA sought to appropriately limit 
the potential liability of Internet service providers was through the 
creation of four "safe harbor" provisions, which protect such entities 
from liability under certain highly specified conditions. 106 CC Bill 
offered the Ninth Circuit the opportunity to interpret several of the 
statutory requirements for Internet companies to qualify for these "safe 
harbor" provisions and to clarify the detailed notice requirements under 
the statute. 107 
A. SERVICES PROVIDED BY CC BILL AND CA VECREEK WHOLESALE 
INTERNET EXCHANGE 
The CC Bill case addressed issues related to Perfect 10' s attempt 
to recover damages related to the alleged infringement of its copyrights 
from defendants responsible for yet another piece of the Internet. The 
appellant CC Bill provided a service that allowed consumers to pay for 
memberships and subscriptions to e-commerce venues using either credit 
cards or checks. 109 Co-appellant Cavecreek Wholesale Internet Exchange 
("CWIE") provided webhosting and Internet connectivity services for a 
fee to website owners. 110 Perfect 10 asserted that CC Bill and CWIE 
clients were infringing its copyrights, and that it began sending letters 
105 [d. § 12B.OI [C)[I] (quoting 108 S.Rep. (DMCA), p. 8). 
106 Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., 351 F.3d 1229,1234 (D.C. 
Cir. 2003). 
107 Perfect [0 v. CC Bill LLC, 488 F.3d at 1109-1118. The decision also addressed issues 
arising under the Communications Decency Act as well as the appellants direct infringement through 
their alleged operation of a website that included altered versions of the copyrighted images. [d. at 
1118-1120. 
109 [d. at 1108. 
110 /d. The services CWIE provided are referred to as "ping, power, and pipe" services, i.e., 
they "ensure that the 'box' or server is on, [that] power is provided to the server and connecting the 
client's service or website to the internet via a data center connection." [d. 
18
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and e-mails to the agent designated to receive notice of infringement for 
both CC Bill and CWIE more than a year prior to filing suit against them 
that informed both companies that their clients were infringing Perfect 
10' s copyrights. III 
B. INTERPRETATION OF THE DMCA SAFE HARBOR PROVISIONS 
1. "Reasonable Implementation" of a Policy to Terminate or Repeat 
Blatant Infringers 
Congress enacted the DMCA in 1998 to "comply with 
international copyright treaties and to update domestic copyright law for 
the online world."ll2 The DMCA includes certain "safe harbor" 
provisions that provided "protection from liability for: (1) transitory 
digital network communications; (2) system caching; (3) information 
residing on systems or networks at the direction of users; and (4) 
information location toolS.,,113 To be eligible for anyone of the four safe 
harbors, an Internet service provider must meet certain threshold 
conditions enumerated in section 512(i), including that the service 
provider 
has adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers and 
account holders of the service provider's system or network of, a 
policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances 
of subscribers and account holders of the service provider's system or 
k h . f' 114 networ w 0 are repeat ill nngers. 
The statute failed, however, to define "reasonably implemented."ll5 
The Ninth Circuit clarified this provision by holding that "a 
service provider 'implements' a policy for purposes of this provision if it 
has a working notification system, a procedure for dealing with DMCA-
complaint notifications, and if it does not actively prevent copyright 
owners from collecting information needed to issue such 
1111d. 
112 Ellison v. Robertson. 357 F.3d \072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, Pub.L. No 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998); 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID 
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12A.02[A](perm.ed., rev. vol. 2003); DAVID W. QUINTO, LAW 
OF INTERNET DISPUTES §6.02 (2002)). 
113 Ellison. 357 F.3d at 1076-77 (citing 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 512(a)-(d)). 
114 Perfect 10 v. CC Bill LLC. 488 F.3d at 1109 (emphasis added, citations omitted). 
Ilsld. 
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notifications." I 16 The court further noted that "[t]he statute permits 
service providers to implement a variety of procedures," and that an 
implementation will be found "reasonable" if, "under appropriate 
circumstances,' the service provider terminates users who repeatedly or 
blatantly infringe copyright."lI7 
The court readily found that CC Bill "implemented" a policy as 
required by the statute, i.e., operating a working notification system, 
having a procedure for dealing with DMCA-complaint notifications, and 
not actively preventing copyright owners from collecting information 
needed to issue such notifications,118 by maintaining a log that routinely 
recorded the email address and/or the name of a webmaster associated 
with allegedly infringing websites. 1I9 Since the record below did not 
specify whether the defendant failed to adequately respond to bona fide 
notices of infringement, the Ninth Circuit, found it necessary to remand 
the issue of whether CC Bill "reasonably" implemented its policy by 
terminating repeat infringers where appropriate under the statute. 120 The 
court determined that Perfect 10' s alleged notifications of the 
infringement were inadequate, and therefore did not raise a genuine issue 
of material fact that defendants failed to reasonably implement their 
policy. 121 The court found the notices were inadequate because they did 
not comply with each of the six individual requirements of §512(c)(3). 122 
116/d. (citing Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1080; Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com,35I F.Supp.2d 1090, 
1102-03 (W.D.Wash. 2004); and In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F.Supp.2d 634, 659 (N.D. Ill. 
2002). 
117 Perfect 10 v. CC Bill LLC, 488 F.3d at 1109-1110 (citing 17 U.S.C. §512(i); CorNs Corp, 
351 F.Supp.2d at 1102). 
118 Perfect 10 v. CC Bill LLC, 488 F.3d at 1109, 1110. 
119 Perfect 10 v. CC Bill LLC, 488 F.3d at 1110-11. The court distinguished two cases finding 
no implementation under this provision. See Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1075 (finding that AOL did not 
reasonably implement its policy against repeat infringers because the email address listed witb the 
U.S. Copyright Office was not updated for more than six months, allowing notices of copyright 
infringement to "fall into a vacuum and go unheeded."); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 
F.Supp.2d at 659 (finding that Aimster's system of encrypting user information, which rendered it 
impossible to ascertain which users were transferring files and infringing copyrights," eviscerate[edl 
any hope" that an effective policy under the DMCA could be carried out). 
120 Perfect 10 v. CC Bill LLC, 488 F.3d at 1113, 1115. 
121 Id. at 1112-13. 
122 Section 501(c)(3) describes the six requirement as follows: 
(A) To be effective under this subsection, a notification of claimed infringement must be a 
written communication provided to the designated agent of a service provider that includes 
substantially the following: 
(i) A physical or electronic signature of a person autborized to act on behalf of the owner 
of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. 
(ii) Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed, or, if mUltiple 
copyrighted works at a single online site are covered by a single notification, a 
20
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The statute mandates "substantial" compliance with the notice 
provisions, which the court interpreted to mean "substantial compliance 
with all of §513(c)(3)'s clauses, not just some of them.,,123 Further, the 
"DMCA requires that a complainant declare, under penalty of perjury, 
that he is authorized to represent the copyright holder, and that he has a 
good-faith belief that the user is infringing.,,124 The court found this 
requirement to be essential to the statutory scheme: 
Accusations of alleged infringement have drastic consequences: A 
user could have content removed, or may have his access terminated 
entirely. If the content infringes, justice has been done. But if it does 
not, speech protected under the First Amendment could be removed. 
We therefore do not require a service provider to start potentially 
invasive proceedings if the complainant is unwilling to state under 
penalty of perjury that he is an authorized representative of the 
copyright owner, and that he has a good-faith belief that the material is 
1· d 125 un lcense . 
Even though Perfect 10' s notices were inadequate and did not 
support its claims, the court remanded to determine whether defendants 
"reasonably" implemented their DMCA policy in light of third-party 
notices of infringement, and the "red-flag" test of §512( c)(1 )(A)(ii) under 
which a service provider may lose immunity if it "fails to take action 
with regard to infringing material when it is aware of facts or 
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.,,126 Since 
application of the safe harbor provisions depended on the reasonable 
implementation of a policy, and not on the specific response to the 
representative list of such works at that site. 
(iii) Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of 
infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, and 
information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the material. 
(iv) Information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to contact the 
complaining party, such as an address, telephone number, and, if available, an electronic 
mail address at which the complaining party may be contacted. 
(v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material 
in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the 
law. 
(vi) A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty of 
peljury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an 
exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. 
17 V.S.C A. § 512(c)(3) (Westlaw 2008). 
123 Perfecl 10 v. CC Bill LLC. 488 F.3d at 1112 (emphasis added). 
124 ld. 
125 Id. (emphasis added). 
126 1d. at 1114. 
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purported infringement notices of a single party, the district court was 
instructed on remand to determine whether third-party notices to 
defendants made them "aware that [they were] providing services to 
repeat infringers, and if so, whether they responded appropriately.,,127 
2. Additional Safe Harbor Provisions 
The court also addressed four even more specific issues arising 
under the safe harbor provisions of the DMCA. First, the court 
considered the provision providing that service providers are not entitled 
to protection under the safe harbor provisions of §§512(a)-(d) if they 
interfere with a statutorily defined range of "standard technical 
measures" that are used by copyright owners to protect copyrights on 
line. 128 The "standard technical measures" are defined as those that: 
(A) have been developed pursuant to a broad consensus of copyright 
owners and service providers in an open, fair, voluntary, multi-
industry standards process; 
(B) are available to any person on reasonable and nondiscriminatory 
terms; and 
(C) do not impose substantial costs on service providers or substantial 
burdens on their systems or networks. 129 
Perfect 10 alleged that CC Bill "interfered with standard technical 
measures" by blocking Perfect 1O's access to CC Bill affiliated websites 
in order to prevent it from discovering whether those websites infringed 
its copyrights. 130 The record developed in the district court was not 
adequate to permit the Ninth Circuit to determine whether accessing a 
website was a "standard technical measure" and, if so, whether CC Bill 
interfered with that access. 131 Consequently, the issue was remanded to 
develop the record further on this issue. 132 
Second, the court considered the safe harbor provision of §512(a) 
pertaining to transitory digital network communications. Section 512(a) 
provides protection to certain service providers who merely act as 
conduits for infringing content. Service providers qualify for this safe 
harbor if they are "an entity offering the transmission, routing, or 
127 ld. at 1115. 
128 ld. 
129 Perfect 10 v. CC Bill LLC, 488 F.3d at 1115. 
130 ld. 
131 ld. 
132 1d. 
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providing of connections for digital online communications, between or 
among points specified by a user, of material of the user's choosing, 
without modification to the content of the material as sent or 
received." 133 
The court noted the importance of this protection to the operation of 
the Internet, since information is sent from computer to computer to 
computer, each of which makes a short-lived copy, in response to every 
individual click on an Internet linkl34 However, the court once again 
found a remand was necessary. CC Bill clearly transmitted credit 
information and proof of payment, "both of which are 'digital online 
communications.''' 135 However, the record did not establish whether 
such payment information was transmitted without modification or often 
enough to qualify CC Bill as a transient holder. 136 Consequently, 
additional fact finding had to be conducted in the court below. 
Third, the court examined whether CC Bill qualified for 
protection under §512(d), which provides that "A service provider shall 
not be liable ... for infringement of copyright by reason of the provider 
referring or linking users to an online location containing infringing 
material or infringing activity, by using information location tools, 
including a directory, index, reference, pointer, or hypertext link.,,137 
The court concluded that, although CC Bill displayed a hyperlink 
that could be viewed as an "information location tool" as part of its 
transactions, the majority of CC Bill's functions did not fall within this 
provision. 138 Consequently, this safe harbor did not apply to immunize 
all of CC Bill's activities. 
Fourth, the court considered whether CC Bill qualified for the safe 
harbor provision under section 512(c) that "limits the liability of 
qualifying service providers for claims of direct, vicarious, and 
contributory infringement for storage at the direction of a user of 
material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or 
for the service provider.,,139 Since Perfect 10's attempted notices of 
133Id.1115_16. 
l34 ld. 
135 Perfect 10 v. CC Bill LLC. 488 F.3d at 1115-16. 
136 1d. 
137 1d. 
138 1d. at 1116-17. 
139 1d. at 1117 (citing H.R. REP. No. 105-551. at 53 (1998)). A service provider qualifies for 
this provision if it meets the requirements of § 512(i) and: 
(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on 
the system or network is infringing; 
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances from 
which infringing activity is apparent; or 
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infringement to CC Bill were inadequate, the decision turned on whether 
the defendant received a direct financial benefit from the infringing 
activity and, also, whether it had the right and ability to control the 
infringing activity. 140 
The court found that "direct financial benefit" under this provision 
of the DMCA should be interpreted consistently with the common law 
standard for vicarious copyright liability. 141 Under this standard, CC Bill 
received a direct financial benefit from the infringing activity only if the 
infringing activity represented a "draw for subscribers, not just an added 
benefit." 142 Here, Perfect 10 had provided no allegations that the 
defendant received such benefit, and the court concluded that this safe 
harbor applied, so long as the court found the threshold conditions of 
section 512(i) were met. 143 
IV. THE PERFECT 10 TRILOGY AND THE ADVANCE OF COPYRIGHT LAW 
ON THE INTERNET 
Taken together, the Peifect 10 trilogy of cases decided numerous 
critical issues regarding the potential liability of companies doing 
business through the Internet for infringement arising from individuals 
viewing, downloading, and purchasing unauthorized copies of 
copyrighted images over the Internet. 
Peifect 10 v. Amazon.com narrowed the theories under which an 
Internet search engine company could be held liable for direct and 
indirect copyright infringement through application of the Ninth Circuit's 
server test. Applying this test, the court limited liability for direct 
copyright infringement in two significant ways. First, unauthorized 
copying of images that are not stored on the search engine company's 
own computers, such as those that are reproduced on a user's computer 
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or disable 
access to, the material; 
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a 
case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity; and 
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3), responds 
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or 
to be the subject of infringing activity. 
17 U.S.C.A. 512(c)(I) (Westlaw 2008). 
140 Perfect 10 v. CC Bill LLC, 488 F.3d at 1117. 
141 [d. (citing the "well established rule of construction that where Congress uses terms that 
have accumulated settled meaning under common law, a court must infer, unless the statute 
otherwise dictates, that Congress meant to incorporate the established meaning of these terms." 
(citations and quotations omitted)). 
142 [d. (citing Ellison,357 F.3d at 1079). 
143 Perfect 10 v. CC Bill LLC, 488 F.3d at 1117. 
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through in-line-linking, does not give rise to liability for direct 
infringement. Second, liability for storing "thumbnail" images on the 
search engine company's servers is limited by the likelihood that a fair 
use defense will prevail due to the fundamentally transformative nature 
of those embodiments. 
The case also rejected the theory that operation of a search engine 
gave rise to liability for vicarious infringement because the search engine 
company did not have the power to "control" the infringement. Finally, 
the decision limited the search engine company's liability for 
contributory infringement to those cases where it had knowledge that the 
infringing images were available using its search engine, it could take 
simple measures to prevent further damage to the copyright owner's 
copyrighted works, and, nonetheless, failed to take such steps. 
Perfect 10 v. Visa International Serv Assn clearly teaches that 
financial institutions whose payment systems are used to process fees 
paid for pirated copies of copyrighted images are not liable for the direct 
infringement, thereby declining Perfect 10' s request to make them the de 
facto police force of the Internet charged with preventing on line 
copyright abuses. Finally, Perfect 10 v. CC Bill provides valuable 
guidance pertaining to the safe harbor and notice provisions of the 
DMCA. Each of these far-reaching decisions represents important 
developments in the law governing protection of intellectual property in 
the evolving landscape of the Internet. 
While these decisions addressed novel issues, Amazon.com and 
Visa, in particular, can be viewed as extensions of legal principles that 
have guided copyright law throughout its history and as faithful 
applications of important policy considerations. Both of these cases 
balance the copyright protections granted to content creators against the 
public interest in unfettered access to information and ideas. 
The monopoly granted to copyright holders has never been 
absolute. "From the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity 
for fair use of copyrighted materials has been thought necessary to fulfill 
copyright's very purpose . . ." 144 Copyright protection was enshrined in 
the Constitution to advance the arts and sciences, and doctrines such as 
the fair use defense developed to "permit [and in fact require] courts to 
avoid rigid application of the copyright statue when, on occasion, it 
would stifle the very creativity which the law is designed to foster.,,145 
Thus, the reasoned limitations on liability set forth in Amazon.com and 
Visa are consistent with the long-standing policy of copyright. 
144 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,575 (1994). 
145/d. (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990». 
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These decisions are also consistent with the public policy goals 
Congress more recently announced in relation to the Internet. 146 As 
stated by the majority opinion in Visa, federal policy specifically 
encourages promotion of the Internet and the minimization of 
governmental intrusion in the medium. Indeed, the court specifically 
stated that it would review Perfect lO's claim in the context of the 
"policy of the United States--(l) to promote the continued development 
of the Internet ... [and] (2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free 
market that presently exists for the Internet ... , unfettered by Federal or 
State regulation." 147 The court noted similar policy statements made 
during passage of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, one of the 
stated purposes of which was to "facilitate the robust development and 
world-wide expansion of electronic commerce, communications, 
research, development, and education in the digital age.,,148 Clearly, the 
court saw its holding, which encourages access to images over the 
Internet, as consistent with these directives. 149 
Finally, these cases represent an instructive example of courts 
grappling to apply intellectual property laws to cases of potential 
infringement that involve technologies that did not exist when the 
applicable statutes were enacted and the leading cases were published. 
The majority in the Visa case'believed that the issues raised by applying 
copyright to images on the Internet were fundamentally different from 
those existing in the pre-digital age, and dismissed certain older cases as 
outmoded. 150 The Visa majority saw these cases as providing little if any 
guidance applicable to the infringement issues before them: 
146 See e.g., Perfect 10 v. Visa International Service Ass'n, 494 F.3d at 794 (quoting 47 U.S.c. 
§§230(b)(1), (2)) and 788, n.2 (quoting S. REP. No. 105-190, at 1-2 (1998)) . 
147 Perfect 10 v. Visa International Service Ass'n, 494 F.3d at 794 (quoting 47 U.S.C. 
§§230(b)(I), (2)). 
148 Perfect 10 v. Visa International Service Ass'n, 494 F.3d at 788, n.2 (quoting S. REP. NO. 
105-190, at 1-2 (1998)). 
149 Perfect 10 v. Visa Int'l Servo Ass'n, 494 F.3d at 797. While, the court noted this policy 
interest, it was not strictly necessary to its holding, which was squarely rooted in precedent 
interpreting the Copyright Act itself. 
150 One line of these older cases held that absentee landlords who lacked knowledge of 
infringing acts of their tenants and who exercised no control over the leased premises were not liable 
for infringing acts committed by their tenants on their premises. See, e.g., Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 
F.3d 686, 688 (2d Cir. 1938). The second line of cases held that "the operator of an entertainment 
venue was held liable only for infringing performances when the operator (I) could control the 
premises, and (2) obtained a direct financial benefit from the audience, who paid to enjoy the 
infringing performance."Fonovisa,76 F.3d at 262 (citing Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co. 283 U.S. 
191 (1931) and Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. V. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 
1929)). 
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The[ tests developed in those cases] were developed for a brick-and-
mortar world, and, as the Napster and Grokster courts implicitly 
recognized by paying little attention to them, they do not lend 
themselves well to application in an electronic commerce context. In 
deciding this case, we are well-advised to follow the lead of the 
Supreme Court's and our own court's cases confronting online 
commerce. 151 
407 
Judge Kozinski, in his dissent, strongly disagreed with this technological 
distinction. 
It is true that these cases were developed in a brick and mortar world, 
but the distinction they draw between those who materially assist 
infringement (and are therefore liable) and those who are more 
remotely involved (and are therefore not liable) is equally important--
perhaps even more important--in cyberspace than in real space. That 
Napster and Grokster did not consider these cases is hardly 
significant. The defendants there were centrally involved in the 
infringing transactions--indeed, as the majority reminds us, their 
systems were created solely to promote infringement, [citation] --and 
thus there could be no argument that their involvement in the 
infringing transactions was too peripheral to give rise to a claim of 
d . fro 152 secon ary 10 IOgement. 
Despite this spirited disagreement, the Ninth Circuit's decisions 
discussed in the article do not, in the end, turn on the nature of the 
technology involved. To the contrary, these cases are firmly grounded in 
fundamental principles of copyright law and apply the controlling rules 
faithfully to the new technologies raised in these cases. While there may 
be room for disagreement with its ultimate holdings, the court was not 
unduly swayed by technology, and, in the end, the decisions are rooted in 
firmly established principles of direct and indirect copyright 
infringement that were formulated independent of the Internet and that 
have been adapted to address the challenges of cyberspace. 
151 Perfect 10 v. Visa International Service Ass'n, 494 F.3d at 798. n.9. 
152 1d. at 816. n. 10 (Kozinski. J .• dissenting) (citation omitted). 
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